

Chapter 2

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

The background information required to explore in detail the early events of the Korean War in July 1950 includes an examination of the readiness of the U.S. Army in 1950; the refugee policy the U.S. forces developed in response to the unexpectedly complex battlefield that the Army faced; the U.S. Army's battlefield experiences in the first weeks of the conflict; and the enemy, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), with whom the U.S. Army clashed in those early days. The U.S. Army rushed into the midst of a rapidly developing North Korean invasion of South Korea with little notice, a new and hitherto unknown enemy, and a complex battlefield rife with civilian refugees who, unlike refugees commonly encountered in World War II, posed a potentially severe threat to the soldiers. Each of these dynamic factors affected the U.S. Army's performance and fundamental behavior in the opening weeks of the Korean War.

I. Post-World War II Korea

Syngman Rhee became the ROK's first elected president on August 15, 1948, and less than one month later, Kim IL Sung proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea throughout North Korea. A series of uprisings proved that the Rhee government was not as popular as it professed. The Soviets soon withdrew their troops from the North, and the American military followed suit in the South in June 1949. The U.S. Army left behind a small force for the training of the South Korean Army called the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG).¹

With the Americans gone, the North Korean Communist regime now felt that 1949 could become the year of victory and reunification. Kim ordered a major guerrilla offensive in 1949, but the guerrillas were too widely scattered, lacked communications, failed to rally a significant proportion of the rural population, and faced a ROK military designed for counterinsurgency operations. Rhee's victory did not come cheaply, though. Some 100,000 Koreans lost their lives in this insurgency and counterinsurgency, the first Korean civil war.² Cross-border raids and probes continued throughout 1949. The South often initiated these raids and usually suffered the worst for their efforts. Tensions on the peninsula continued to grow.

II. U.S. Combat Readiness in 1950

In 1950, the United States Army's combat readiness did not match the abilities of the NKPA, who regularly bested in combat the U.S. Army troops that deployed from Japan to defend the Republic of Korea in July 1950. Staff officers dispatched from the United States to Korea to observe the Eighth Army's operations reported significant training, personnel, equipment, and leadership deficiencies.³

The Army's difficulties in Korea resulted from a significant imbalance between the resources provided to the Army and the numerous occupation, research, and training

assistance missions it was assigned. These missions showed that the President and much of Congress were convinced that America had to remain significantly engaged with the rest of the world if the U.S. was to avoid what many believed were mistakes made after World War I that, in turn, led to World War II.⁴

Expectations about future wars also affected the resources provided to the Army. Between 1946 and 1950, one scenario dominated both civilian and military thinking about America's next war: World War III with the Soviet Union. The President and many in Congress hoped that the Strategic Air Command, armed with atomic bombs, would deter the Soviet Union from even starting such a war. Resultantly, the President and Congress tended to favor the Air Force over the other services when allocating funds and expressed little interest in the readiness of the Army for immediate combat.⁵

III. The Eighth Army's Readiness in Occupied Japan

The Department of the Army's Inspector General in March 1949 found that occupation duties, inadequate funding, and high levels of personnel turnover had had such deleterious effects upon Eighth Army's readiness that the "depletion of combat units in Japan is so widespread as to make the conception of a four division military force an illusion."⁶ The next month, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (FEC), directed that Eighth Army's four divisions begin a progressive training schedule designed to make them combat-effective units. Company-level training was to be completed by December 1949, battalion level by May 1950, regimental level by July 1950, and division level by December 1950. Also in June 1949, Eighth Army established a new method of evaluating and reporting unit readiness.⁷

Eighth Army forecasted three obstacles to effective unit training. The most important was the steady flow of officers and enlisted men trained in their specialty to replace personnel returning to the United States after completing their tour in Japan. Another problem was a shortage of equipment such as mortars, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, howitzers, and recoilless rifles. Finally, there was a shortage of adequate training areas located near the units; some units had to travel up to 200 miles to find sufficient maneuver training space.⁸

Eighth Army's unit readiness evaluation, computed at the end of September 1949, revealed significant progress. Under Eighth Army's scores, the 1st Cavalry Division remained the highest ranked of the four divisions. The 25th Infantry Division followed next with the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions in third and fourth place respectively.⁹ Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commander of Eighth Army, rated his command at 55.2% overall effectiveness and wrote that the "substantial progress made by the units of Eighth Army in their efforts to obtain Combat Effectiveness is considered gratifying."¹⁰ Insufficient maneuver and range areas, however, continued to affect training seriously, most noticeably in the 1st Cavalry Division.¹¹ This division had only one area available to conduct combat firing exercises.¹²

IV. Changes in the Army's Force Structure

The Army's one-third cut in the authorized strength of divisions would certainly affect combat effectiveness. This strength reduction forced the four Eighth Army divisions in Japan not to fill certain units. Within each division, each of the three infantry regiments (except the 24th Infantry Regiment) lost one of its three battalions, and both the tank company and the counter-fire platoon were cut. Also cut from the divisions was one of the three firing batteries in each of the four field artillery battalions. The antiaircraft artillery battalion lost two of its three firing batteries, and the divisional tank battalion was reduced to one company.¹³

These cuts to the divisions' structure had other implications besides the loss of manpower. Army tactical doctrine was based on the rule of three. In both the offense and the defense, the standard tactic involved committing two subordinate units and keeping the third as a reserve, something a regimental commander could no longer do with only two battalions. Additionally, without his tank company, the regimental commander lost his most effective tank-killing system. The loss of one-third of the division's field artillery batteries also significantly weakened the division's firepower.¹⁴ Likewise, no doctrine existed to guide commanders in how to conduct operations with their newly reduced structure.

V. The Eighth Army's Readiness Challenges in Early 1950

Eighth Army in June 1950 not only lacked many of the units required by American doctrine but its equipment and supplies, save for food and medicines, were mainly of World War II vintage. Therefore, much unit equipment by 1950 was worn and required extensive maintenance. Almost all on-hand ammunition had been produced during World War II and much of it had been improperly stored since the end of the war, resulting in a significantly higher dud rate than normal.¹⁵ In addition, units in Japan did not receive the 3.5-inch anti-tank rocket launcher to replace the less effective 2.36-inch version used in World War II. The standard tank for the U.S. Army was the M46 Patton, but limited production meant that some armor units had either the obsolescent M4E8 Sherman or the limited standard M26 Pershing.¹⁶

Given the budget and force structure limits placed upon it, the Army had no choice but to man its overseas garrisons by individual rotation, which resulted in an average annual personnel turnover rate of approximately 40%.¹⁷ By June 1950, the active-duty enlisted force sat at 98.8% for the Regular Army, but enlistments lagged behind requirements. The Army was also short of junior officers. These shortfalls left the Army in June 1950 approximately 37,000 soldiers short of its authorized active-duty strength.¹⁸

Problems of personnel quality as well as quantity also existed. Specialized advanced individual training did not exist for most new soldiers in the combat arms between 1946 and 1950. After a branch-immaterial basic training, they joined their units; the Army then expected the units to provide the required advanced training. Further-

more, a number of battalion, regimental, and division commanders had spent most of their careers in staff and administrative positions and commanded units more because of seniority than because of demonstrated leadership proficiency.¹⁹

The Army of June 1950 had focused on combat readiness for little more than a year, not enough time to overcome all the effects of demobilization and occupation duty. Furthermore, the war in 1950 became the war that neither the Army nor the nation had expected to fight. The fact that the United States suffered heavy casualties and serious reverses on the battlefield during July 1950 comes as no surprise.

VI. The North Korean Invasion of June 25, 1950

The NKPA surged across the 38th parallel in pouring rain during the early morning hours of June 25, 1950. One-half of the ROK Army was on leave that Sunday morning, a fact that contradicts theories that a northern response to a southern probe ignited the war. South Korea had been caught flat-footed and began to fall back, but the South Korean Army did not disintegrate.

Once he became convinced that the attack marked something other than a cross-border thrust, President Truman and his administration acted swiftly and decisively. Less than 24 hours after the invasion, the President convened his closest advisors and ordered immediate American air and naval support for the ROK. The blatant nature of this invasion galvanized the President, Congress, and the nation.

If anything, the United Nations responded off the mark to the North Korean invasion. On the day of the war's outbreak (Eastern Standard Time), the UN Security Council simply condemned the attack as "a breach of the peace" and demanded that the DPRK's forces withdraw from the ROK "forthwith."

The Korean War was a United Nations' war prosecuted under the auspices of the unified (or combined) United Nations Command (UNC) headed, until April 1951, by General Douglas MacArthur. Ultimately, 22 member states of the UN contributed to the UNC cause with no less than 16 actually supplying combat troops and several UN nations supplying air and naval forces.²⁰

All of this support proved inadequate in the first weeks of the war. ROK forces disastrously lost Seoul on June 29, and General MacArthur, after a reconnaissance of the area, concluded that only American ground troops could save the situation. The result was to commit the first U.S. soldiers to see action against enemy ground troops since World War II: Task Force Smith. However, Task Force Smith would encounter not only a strong NKPA, but also a growing refugee problem that developed in the combat area of operations. This problem soon demanded the Allies' immediate attention and the introduction of policies designed to cope with this unexpected battlefield conundrum.

VII. The Refugee Situation in July 1950

The refugee crisis, the mass of humanity flowing away from the combat zones, enhanced the NKPA's ability to exploit the U.S. and UN forces' diminished capacity to distinguish friend from foe. The refugee situation was the NKPA's first true combat multiplier in the early stages of the war. Infiltrating NKPA soldiers, routinely dressed as civilians, created an air of confusion and concern for the U.S. and UN forces. A variety of methods and directives were employed to control not only the refugee situation but also the potential tactical threat these refugees posed to the UN forces.

Following the North Korean cross-border assault on June 25, the civilian population quickly left their homes to escape the fighting. Refugees clogged roadways en masse, carrying personal items both by hand and pushcart to flee the combat zones. This enormous human exodus created significant problems for the UN forces. The G-1 (Personnel) Summary of the 24th Infantry Division War Diary for July 23-August 25, 1950, states that: "One of the greatest problems encountered was control of refugees...The extent of this problem is difficult to describe; often a refugee concentration would contain 30-40,000 people plus cattle, horses, carts, etc."²¹ UN forces could not move supplies, equipment, or personnel effectively when fleeing refugees obstructed the roads. Not only did refugees clog the major road networks, but the refugees also became a mechanism for North Korean infiltration. The U.S. forces recognized that they had to control the movement of refugees.

VIII. The First Refugee Policies

One of the first policy documents to discuss controlling refugee movement was issued by Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), on July 23, 1950. Movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was permitted from 10:00 AM to 12:00 noon only; no ox carts, trucks, or civilian cars were allowed to operate on highways; no fields could be worked; no schools, shops, or industries could be operated unless they were essential to the war effort; and municipal authorities, local police, and National Police were to enforce this directive. The National Police would collect all refugees from the countryside and highway and carry them by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel, including an attached Korean CIC Team, would screen the refugees at established roadblocks and checkpoints. Units within the Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening.²² On July, 24, 1950, when refugees appeared in the Division Command Post area, 1st Cavalry Division personnel loaded refugees on trains headed for Kumchon. Upon arrival, the CIC interrogated the refugees and detained the suspicious ones. The remaining refugees were told to continue south. The 1st Cavalry Division dropped leaflets on small villages in the area, telling the people to move north because the U.S. forces would treat them as the enemy if refugees occupied the combat area.²³

On July 25, 1950, a conference took place at the Capitol Building in Taegu. Participants from the Republic of Korea Government, American Embassy, National Police,

United Nations, and the Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) agreed upon a plan to control refugee movement.²⁴ As a result of this meeting, EUSAK issued a four-part, detailed message on July 26, 1950:

Part I: Effective immediately the following procedure will be adhered to by all commands relative to the flow or movement of all refugees in battle areas and rear areas. No refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in groups will cease immediately. No areas will be evacuated by Koreans without a direct order from Commanding General EUSAK or upon order of Division Commanders. Each division will be assigned three National Police liaison officers to assist in clearing any area of the civilian populace that will interfere with the successful accomplishment of his mission.

Part II: Procedure for clearing areas. Division commanders will inform National Police Officers of the area or sector to be evacuated, the route, and the time the area will be cleared. National Police will immediately clear the area. Food, water, and comfort items for these refugees will be provided by the Vice Minister of Social Affairs through the National Police. All refugees will move along their predetermined route to selected concentration areas from sunup until sundown. This will be a controlled movement under the direction and supervision of the National Police and representatives from the office of Korean Welfare Affairs.

Part III: Movement of Korean civilians during hours of darkness. There will be absolutely no movement of Korean civilians, as individuals or groups in battle areas or rear areas, after the hours of darkness. Uniformed Korean police will rigidly enforce this directive.

Part IV: To accomplish the procedure, as outlined in this directive, leaflets will be prepared and dropped in all areas forward and rear of the battle line to effectively disseminate this information. National Police will further disseminate this information to all Korean civilians by means of radio, messenger, and the press.²⁵

On July 27, 1950, Lieutenant General Walker's Headquarters EUSAK (Eighth U.S. Army, Korea) G-2 (Intelligence Staff Section) issued Intelligence Instruction No. 4 describing actions CIC teams must take relative to the movement and interrogation of refugees: To ensure compliance with South Korean Government regulations governing the flow of refugee travel and to assist in proper exploitation by this Division, CIC teams will:

- a. Maintain daily contact and coordinate with the South Korean Army and local Korean law enforcement agencies charged by the Korean Government with operation and control of refugee movements.

- b. Maintain surveillance and inspection of police and South Korean Army refugee check points determining and reporting on sufficiency and efficiency of manning personnel.

c. Insure [sic] the normal flow of arrestees from police to South Korean Army control. Refugees of intelligence value must be made available for G-2 exploitation before local disposal.

d. Screen, check and interrogate detainees indicated by preliminary police and South Korean Army interrogations to be of counter intelligence value.

e. Conduct spot checks to insure [sic] that all prisoners and detainees of counter intelligence value are made available to CIC interrogators by the police and / or South Korean Army.

f. High level NK agents as discovered, will be made available to Army G-2 for further interrogation and CINCFE disposition.

g. Check and report on curfew regulations and enforcement.²⁶

The refugee problem was clearly widespread and not restricted to any one division's area of operations. For example, during the last week of July, the 25th Infantry Division, located north of the 1st Cavalry Division, was being strongly pressed by NKPA forces. The 25th Infantry Division Activities Report for July 27, 1950, in a paragraph on civil affairs and military government, reiterates the refugee policy:

A message was sent to the Commanding Officers of all front line units concerning refugees and Korean civilians within the combat zone. In addition to the information and previous instructions in regards to this problem, the Commanding Officers were again told of the seriousness of this condition and that all levels would take drastic action to prevent movement of all Korean personnel into and within the combat zone. Civilians moving within the combat zone would be considered as enemy.²⁷

Leaflets provided one method of conveying the theater policy on refugee movement to civilians in or near the combat zone. An order issued sometime in 1950 for these leaflets from the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Branch stipulates that the leaflets would read as follows:

Effective immediately, civilians are forbidden to move through the battle lines. The aggressor has been taking advantage of such movement to smuggle soldiers through, disguised as civilians.

Civilian residents of some areas may be evacuated when the UN Commanding Officers consider it advisable. Any such evacuation will be under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs and the National Police.

When such an evacuation has been approved, you will be told which roads to follow and where to go. You will move only by daylight. No one will move at night.

These orders will be rigidly enforced by the National Police in order to protect the security of the armies of the Republic and of the United Nations.

If you are not told to evacuate by the authorities, be calm and remain in your homes. Confusion helps only the Communist aggressors.²⁸

IX. Initial Confusion and the Soldier's View of the Refugee Problem

The average soldier arriving in Korea knew little about the country's people, culture, or beliefs. Rumors about North Korean tactics and problems with refugees undoubtedly fueled the soldiers' imaginations long before their first contact with the enemy and the populace. Likewise, many U.S. officers arrived in Korea lacking insight into the country and the situation at hand. Harold J. Noble, the first secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Korea, wrote in his book *Embassy at War* that newly arriving American officers displayed an "astonishing amount of contempt for the ROK Army." Noble claimed Major General Hobart Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division commander, newly arrived in Korea, told a press conference that "he did not intend to take the ROK Army into consideration at all in making his estimates and dispositions and that his solution for the Communist's infiltration tactics was to force every Korean out of the division's area of responsibility, on the theory that once they were removed, any Korean caught in the area would be an enemy agent." Noble also said Gay's "order included the Korean National police, whom he sent back to Taegu." Whatever General Gay might have said when he first arrived in Korea, there is no evidence that he put any of these ideas into practice. His official policy on handling refugees dated July 23, 1950 (described earlier) made the National Police the responsible authority for handling refugees.²⁹

The 8th Cavalry Regiment War Diary contains an entry for 10:00 AM on July 24 that reads as follows: "No refugees to cross the front lines. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children."³⁰ The source of the message was a telephone call to the 8th Cavalry Regimental headquarters from an 8th Cavalry Regiment officer (staff officer, not a commander) working in the 1st Cavalry Division operations section as a liaison officer to the division headquarters from his regiment. A search of documents did not reveal a similar entry in the records of the other regiments (the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regiments) in the division.

As outlined above, the Eighth Army issued its own expanded refugee policy on July 26, 1950. The entry in the regimental diary was not an order but more likely the liaison officer's misinterpretation of the Eighth Army's soon to be published guidance which stated, "No, repeat, no refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time, movement of all Koreans in groups will cease immediately." This policy also announced the assignment of three National Police officers to each division to act as liaison officers to assist in carrying out the new policy. Within 48 hours of the misleading regimental diary entry, on July 26th, the 1st Cavalry Division received the detailed Eighth Army refugee control policy, which clarified and superceded the 8th Cavalry Regiment's liaison officer's initial misinterpretation. There is no evidence that this misinterpretation was ever passed down from the Division Headquarters to the 5th or 7th Cavalry Regi-

ments, the subordinate battalions of the 8th Cavalry or any other units assigned to the division.

The reality of the situation on the ground was daunting for the soldiers charged with implementing the 1st Cavalry Division's refugee policy. Perhaps the most descriptive account of the refugee problem appears in a monograph entitled "Civilian Control in South Korea" written by Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Powhida, who was assigned to the 1st Cavalry and Division G-3 (Operations) section during the early days of the war. This monograph was incorporated into Training Bulletin No. 3, *Lessons Learned in Korea*, published by the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), November 28, 1950. The following excerpt captures the nature of the refugee problem that the division faced:

On or about the 21st [July 1950,] the 1st Cavalry Division moved over through Yomgchu through Teague up to Yong Dong. All along this route fleeing refugees interfered with our move. In some instances refugees were hit and killed by our vehicles. It seemed as though the countryside was alive and on the move in all directions. Communists in Allied territory were giving false information to villagers to start them on their way along the narrow rocky roads causing the retarding of all Allied movement of vehicles.

Combat Phase

Once the Division was in the lines and readying for their first battle civilians came pouring through the battle positions. At this time, this officer was assigned as liaison with two of our regiments with headquarters in Yong Dong. Arriving at this town I immediately contacted the police chief -- the only city official remaining in town. I asked him how many police he had. He informed me [that he had] ninety. I told him to divide them and disperse them in the areas of our battalions in the line. He promised to do so. He was instructed to get his police to move the refugees down trails, off highways, onto a rail bed and direct them to Kumchon where we would arrange for their screening and evacuation. Later the police chief was to meet me in a village on our left flank for control of refugees there. This plan was temporary and it was about fifty percent effective.

The masses of refugees straining through and pouring down the highways into our positions caused grave concern to everyone in the Division. It was obviously a civil affairs problem but our Division staff was not augmented by a civil affairs section.

Due to my World War II training and experiences I sat down and drew up a plan for controlling civilian circulation. After a study by my section chief, the G-2 and Chief of Staff, the plan was approved and in addition to my other duties I was given the responsibility of refugee control. All steps outlined were immediately put into effect. The machinery outlined screened some 50,000 refugees in about a week.³¹

The introduction to this same monograph serves as an excellent summary of refugee control issues during the early days of the war:

Under present conditions of war in South Korea, especially in the combat zone, the civilian control is a paramount problem to the fighting forces.

The problem stems from the following facts:

1. Allied withdrawal instead of moving forward.
2. Weak village and city governments (lack [of] people's confidence).
3. Weak police force (corrupt) and weak in enforcing the law.
4. An illiterate populace.
5. Communist elements creating confusion in Allied area of occupation.
6. Distrust of government officials.
7. Infiltration of North Korean agents and troops in civilian garb through Allied lines disguised as refugees.
8. The inability of the Allies to tell the difference between a South Korean and a North Korean.
9. The make-up of the Oriental mind is such that it is difficult to determine whether the populace in [the] Allied zone of operation is with them or against them.
10. No trained personnel in civil affairs or military government [is] with [the] fighting forces.
11. Due to the piecemeal commitment, the 24th Division did not have time nor personnel to cope with the problem of controlling the civilians. This was also true of the 25th Division.³²

This refugee problem profoundly affected the U.S. Army's behavior in the early weeks of the Korean War. In fact, the first few weeks of the Korean War exposed the U.S. Army to a number of its own shortcomings as discussed earlier in this chapter. But one factor that truly caught the U.S. troops by surprise early in the war was the stark reality of dealing with refugees who clogged and complicated the battlefield to a hitherto unknown, and unexpected, degree.

X. The First Weeks of the War

Task Force (TF) Smith (1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 24th Division) was rushed from Japan to the rice paddies and exhausting hills of Korea. Although TF Smith's men fought well (they were in very good physical condition), they could only delay, not stop, the NKPA onslaught.³³

The UNC fought a series of delaying actions, losing each one but buying time for the arrival of more troops and equipment from the U.S. and its UN allies. The worst defeat at this stage of the war occurred at Taejon, where the NKPA's 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions mauled the shaky U.S. 24th Infantry Division and the 19th and 34th Infantry Regiments. The 24th's commanding general, Major General William Dean, promised General Walker that his division would hold the North Koreans for two days at Taejon,

giving Walker desperately needed time to bring the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division on line.

Cohesion fell apart in the planned retreat from Taejon. Troops straggled and became lost in the hills and paddy fields. But Walker now had his extra day when each day counted. Taejon saw the last deployment of significant numbers of NKPA armor and was probably the last time the Korean People's Army Air Force supported ground combat. The battles at Osan, Pyongtaek, the Kum River, Kongju, and Taejon were all obvious U.S. defeats but had their redeeming consequences: they bought time. Meanwhile, UNC air power took an increasing toll of NKPA equipment and personnel. Within a matter of days, the UNC achieved control of the air over both North and South Korea, and the command's sea power patrolled the entire peninsula's coasts.

The North Koreans pushed the UNC ground troops out of one defensive position after another. The NKPA employed stereotypical tactics that seemed to work most of the time: the NKPA's troops would fix a UNC position in front and then attack along the flanks, cutting off all retreat routes. The NKPA also employed the unnerving tactic of deploying some of its troops in civilian garb to fight as infiltrators and guerrillas behind the porous UNC lines. Others were South Koreans press-ganged into the NKPA without the niceties of a uniform.³⁴

The ROK forces and the U.S. Army continued their retreat. Few Americans would have taken comfort in the knowledge that the NKPA was, considering its excellent heavy equipment and its iron discipline, perhaps the best army in the world at the time. The NKPA boasted a motorized, armor-tipped, fast-moving force with modest air cover and mobile heavy artillery.³⁵

The war progressed almost entirely in favor of the NKPA. The 24th Infantry Division lost a significant amount of equipment, particularly in the battle for Taejon. The thrifty North Koreans picked up and used this abandoned equipment. These steady withdrawals and defeats dispirited the U.S. troops. Many argued that the troops were exhausted and often suffering from dysentery contracted from water in the rice paddies. The summer of 1950 also proved one of the hottest in generations. But the NKPA troops operated in continuous combat from the beginning of the invasion in the same heat and with minimal air protection and artillery support.

The Army did not settle for excuses but instead dispatched a team of high-ranking officers from Headquarters Army Ground Forces to South Korea soon after the Taejon defeat to discover what went wrong and why. The Team's report proved damning:

Like all green troops, they magnified the strength of the enemy, and tended to become panicky and stampede when small hostile groups got in their rear...Infantry troops were specifically deficient in...aggressiveness in counter-attack, steadiness under fire, [and] confidence in their own weapons...Lack of leadership in regimental and subordinate echelons was often

evident, in both field and company grades, and among the non-commissioned officers.

The report also stated that the troops had been committed piecemeal into combat after inadequate training. In addition, officers proved to be the least prepared for combat.³⁶ The only bright spot at the time is the fact that Eighth Army developed such an unvarnished account of its own shortcomings without excuses or special pleadings.

The NKPA hardly paused after its victory at Taejon. The North Koreans' excellent 6th Division moved rapidly down the western coastal road net, and UNC intelligence basically lost or misidentified them. The battered and weary 24th U.S. Division, with no time to replace its devastating losses in men and materiel, received orders on July 24 to block the NKPA force in the Chinju area. The following day, the division's 19th Infantry Regiment took the Hadong road junction 35 miles southwest of Chinju and departed the following morning. On July 27, the newly arrived and completely untested motorized 3rd Battalion of the 29th Infantry (which had no time to calibrate rifles, test-fire, or clean the cosmoline from their weapons) was ambushed at the Hadong Pass and suffered the heaviest casualties in any single engagement of any U.S. Army unit of the Korean War. The same day, when the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry, moved north from Chinju toward Anui to replace the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, the NKPA's 4th Division badly shot up B and C companies of the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry. In all, on that day of "aggressive defense", the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 29th Infantry suffered 618 casualties. When American forces overran the area in late September, the soldiers discovered the bodies of some 313 American troops.³⁷

These descriptions of a U.S. Army on the run in the early days of the Korean War effectively illustrate the Army's initial combat experiences in the Korean War. In a matter of days, the NKPA bloodied the soldiers' noses in several critical battles. This pattern of events continued until early August, when the Army finally showed signs of standing firm in the face of the NKPA's extremely effective battlefield tactics.

XI. The North Korean People's Army in 1950

The U.S. Army faced an opponent, the NKPA, who used a mix of tactics familiar and unfamiliar to American soldiers. The NKPA, like the U.S. Army, practiced conventional combined-arms warfare, tactics that combined infantry, artillery, and tanks. Unlike the U.S. Army, the NKPA also relied heavily on infiltration tactics, the practice of slipping groups of soldiers through enemy lines to gather intelligence, to attack artillery positions and supply points, and to block roads. The NKPA routinely sought to increase the effectiveness of both their combined-arms attacks and their infiltration efforts through the extensive exploitation of civilians on the battlefield. These efforts, by forcing civilians to move into enemy positions ahead of conventional attacks and by using civilian refugees as cover for infiltration, often proved very effective during July 1950 and created serious tactical problems for American units. The success and effectiveness of the NKPA to this point was a direct result of their development; their effective leadership; and the time-tested, Soviet-style tactics they employed on the battlefield.

Officially activated in February 1948, the NKPA grew rapidly during the next 29 months; by June 1950 the NKPA boasted a fighting strength of approximately 116,400, with 10 infantry divisions and a tank brigade as its major combat elements. North Korea also had a paramilitary Border Constabulary of approximately 18,600 men; this force could conduct limited combat operations and serve as the cadre to form additional NKPA divisions.³⁸

Normally a new army expanded this quickly would face severe problems in creating and sustaining tactical skill among the tens of thousands of men conscripted beginning in the summer of 1948. During July 1950, however, many NKPA units demonstrated high levels of tactical skill on the battlefield. A major reason for the success of the NKPA was that approximately one-third of its strength comprised ethnic Koreans who had served with the Chinese Communist forces during the Chinese Civil War. The Chinese Communists allowed these men to return to North Korea, where they were immediately incorporated into the NKPA; eleven of the 21 infantry regiments that invaded South Korea mainly comprised these veterans. Additionally, these veterans filled many of the key leadership positions in other units of the NKPA.³⁹

These veterans, along with the thousands of conscripts, benefited from the Soviet Union's extensive assistance to the NKPA. The Soviets provided the NKPA with the weapons, equipment, and supplies needed to create a modern combined-arms force. While the heavy weapons, the tanks and artillery, supplied to North Korea far exceeded what the U.S. supplied to South Korea, they were generally older designs superseded by more modern equipment in the Soviet Army. For example, the NKPA received the T34 / 85 tank instead of the IS-III tank. Several thousand Soviet advisors assisted in the creation and training of units, and a special team of officers helped the NKPA in 1950 plan the invasion of South Korea. The result of this Soviet assistance was an NKPA whose organization and tactical doctrine closely matched the World War II Soviet Army. The NKPA infantry divisions resembled Soviet rifle divisions of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and supporting units. The battalions of the NKPA's tank brigade were attached to infantry divisions to help break through enemy defenses. Following Soviet doctrine, the standard NKPA tactic in the attack was a double envelopment; while infantry supported by tanks and artillery penetrated the enemy's defenses frontally, other infantry units would move around the distracted enemy's flanks. Caught in this double envelopment, the enemy would either be destroyed or forced to withdraw with heavy losses in men and equipment. However, the NKPA lacked the large numbers of non-divisional artillery and tank units that in the Soviet Army provided significant combat power for breaking through and deeply penetrating enemy defenses.⁴⁰

XII. North Korean Infiltration Tactics

Also in accordance with Soviet doctrine, the NKPA supported its combined-arms attacks with extensive infiltration efforts. Reconnaissance units infiltrated to gather intelligence about enemy positions, particularly the locations of the enemy's flanks to assist

in envelopment attacks and the enemy's artillery positions so that NKPA artillery could suppress them with counter-battery fire. Other infiltrated units would assist envelopment attacks by hitting enemy defensive positions from the rear, destroying enemy artillery positions and supply points, and establishing road blocks that would prevent the enemy from either reinforcing its defensive line or withdrawing from that line. Infiltrated NKPA units would also attempt to contact any South Korean guerrilla forces or civilian sympathizers in the area for assistance in gathering intelligence and attacking enemy units.⁴¹

While the U.S. Army gave extensive thought to the problems of defending against combined-arms attacks, the Army paid little attention to infiltration tactics. The Army itself did not employ infiltration tactics in the offense, and its defensive doctrine barely addressed the issue and then only in the context of conducting counter-guerrilla operations. In 1947, the Army established the "Aggressor" program to provide a distinctive opponent for American units during training. Like today's "Opposing Forces," the program created a fictitious enemy, the "Aggressor," complete with its own uniform and tactics. "Aggressor" tactics stressed the double envelopment as "fundamental for units from platoon to army group levels" but only mentioned infiltration as an aside in discussing the use of the submachine-gun company.⁴²

In 1950, American units, under-strength, attempting to defend wide frontages, and without training or doctrine on infiltration tactics, quickly found the NKPA's infiltration abilities to be a formidable threat. Many U.S. veterans interviewed by the U.S. Review Team stated they had been warned about infiltrators. On July 17, Eighth Army issued "Combat Lesson Number One," which warned that the NKPA would infiltrate troops behind American lines as individuals or in small groups. These troops would then move to an assembly area from where they would stage attacks on American positions. Depending on the depth of the infiltration and the time used to conduct the maneuver, the NKPA could build a force of "100 to 1,000 men or even more." "Combat Lesson Number One," drawing on American doctrine for defense of wide frontages, advised Eighth Army's units to locate the infiltrators' assembly areas "promptly by aggressive patrolling and intelligence operations." Then "reserve echelons supporting front line units, particularly artillery or armored vehicles, must be promptly dispatched to the area in order to liquidate the assembled forces."⁴³

Unfortunately for the Eighth Army, it had almost nothing in the way of "reserve echelons" in July 1950. All but one of its infantry regiments had only two of the normal three battalions; American doctrine called for the third battalion to serve as a reserve that infantry regiments could use for just this type of contingency. Eighth Army also fell short of artillery and armored vehicles. It had none of the non-divisional artillery battalions normally assigned to a field army. Its armored capability, which should have been six companies of medium tanks and a reconnaissance company of light tanks in each infantry division, instead comprised just one company of light tanks and an armored reconnaissance company in each division. These weaknesses, together with the wide frontages they attempted to hold, made American units in July 1950 particularly vulnerable to NKPA infiltration. Impressed by the effectiveness of NKPA infiltration efforts, the

U.S. Army later in the year organized Ranger companies to provide American infantry divisions with a unit able to conduct infiltration missions.⁴⁴

XIII. The NKPA's Exploitation of Civilians

The NKPA's exploitation of civilians on the battlefield greatly enhanced both the NKPA's combined-arms envelopment attacks and infiltration efforts. Two major forms of this exploitation existed. The first consisted of NKPA soldiers disguising themselves in traditional Korean peasant clothing to infiltrate through enemy lines. The second form consisted of NKPA soldiers forcing civilians, usually refugees attempting to flee the battlefield, to assist them either by providing cover for infiltration efforts or by moving in front of NKPA units attacking enemy positions. The U.S. Army had rarely faced such tactics during World War II and then usually in an environment where the civilians were of a different nationality from the enemy. Thus Eighth Army was not prepared psychologically for the NKPA's exploitation of Korean civilians; likewise, the army was unprepared to field the specialized military police, counter-intelligence, and civil affairs units required to counter this type of exploitation at the start of the war.

During July 1950, a number of reports surfaced of NKPA soldiers disguised in traditional Korean peasant clothing attempting to infiltrate American positions either on their own or among refugee columns. Examples include:

- 24th Infantry Division Prisoner of War (PW) Interrogation, time of capture July 7, 1950 -- "20 men are sent from each division dressed as civilian to get information on the number of men, type of weapons of the enemy before attacking."⁴⁵
- A message from Headquarters Eighth United States Army (EUSA) dated July 11, 1950 -- "Reports from Korean sources state North Korean soldiers are changing into civilian clothes and coming through lines in American sector with rifles concealed under clothing. Refugees moving from front and flank must be searched to apprehend any such personnel."⁴⁶
- Message No. 1 from 24th Infantry Division G-2, 122200 July 1950 -- "reports confirmed by reliable sources indicate that North Korean troops in small groups enter homes along line of advance, reappear in civilian clothing concealing small arms and infiltrate to our flanks and rear for the purpose of harassing our troops."⁴⁷
- 24th Infantry Division Counter Intelligence Corps team, July 12, 1950 -- "A 2LT in NKPA was interrogated and said he and another soldier were issued civilian clothing to wear on patrol. These were the clothing they had on at time of capture."⁴⁸
- 25th Infantry Division memo to G-3, notes on liaison trip to U.S. Army Forces In Korea and 24th Infantry Division, July 12-14, 1950 -- "Guerilla activity - Pot shots at single vehicles are not uncommon. En[emy] soldiers are infiltrating in civ clothes."⁴⁹

- Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) Periodic Intelligence Report No. 6, 182400 July 50 -- "...in the west sector N.K. troops entered our lines posing as peasant refugees carrying unassembled firearms and uniforms in bundles."⁵⁰
- 25th Infantry Division G-3 Activities Report of July 19, 1950 -- "The units were advised to be alert for enemy disguised as peasants with weapons and uniforms in bundle. These soldiers were infiltrating behind our lines."⁵¹
- Message from Commanding General, EUSAK, dated 191435K July 1950 -- "One report in west sector NK troops entered our lines posing as peasant refugees carrying unassembled firearms and uniforms in bundles."⁵²
- EUSAK Periodic Intelligence Report No. 8, 202400 July 50 -- "Enemy reportedly moved toward our lines along the tops of mountain ridges disguised as farmers whose dress is predominantly white. Women and children accompanied these groups. When the enemy reached a point adjacent to and behind friendly lines, they were equipped with arms. Upon a given signal, fire was directed from ridges upon the U.S. flanks and rear forcing the friendly forces to retire. Further to the rear the withdrawing forces were cleverly ambushed."⁵³
- Prisoner of War interrogation by 24th ID G-2 Language Section, July 20, 1950 -- "...He and another PW like him was attached to a guerrilla unit of about twenty men. All of these soldiers were dressed in civilian clothing and their rank were not known..."⁵⁴
- 25th Infantry Division Annex A (INTELLIGENCE) to Operation Order No. 8, 220030 July 1950 -- "CG 8 ROK Div has advised that persons in white clothing seen frequently on the tops of the hills adjacent to MSR's and other routes are not friendly. He advised immediate remedial action be taken to prevent this observation of friendly movement and disposition."⁵⁵
- 25th Infantry Division Periodic Report #10, 221800K to 231800K July 1950 -- "Again, white clad farmers appeared with rifles after contact was made with the enemy. Extreme caution should be used in allowing native civilian personnel to remain in close proximity to troops when on approach march or in contact (24 RCT)."⁵⁶
- 25th Infantry Division Periodic Report #11, 231800K to 241800K July 1950 -- "Use is made of troops infiltrated into our rear for additional support, the white clad farmers appearing on the high ground again today in the 27th RCT zone."⁵⁷
- The EUSAK War Diary for July 23, 1950, which provides material from the interrogation of four American officers of the 24th Infantry Division -- "All agree this is a problem of major proportions. They strongly suspect North Koreans soldiers of

coming through the lines as refugees, securing arms and uniforms behind our lines and operating against our rear."⁵⁸

- 25th Infantry Division War Diary dated July 24, 1950 -- "Continued use was made by the enemy of troops infiltrated into our rear for additional support. The white-clad soldiers continued to appear. Native personnel in the combat zone must be considered hostile until proven friendly."⁵⁹
- A message from Recon Troop (south) to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 281815 (TOR) July 1950 -- "We have pulled back to our original positions. The pass on the way to the 27 RCT is a regular mousetrap. Everyone should be cautioned about going thru towns and leaving these civilians behind them. LT Friant is in there now and I know he has the enemy behind him. That is what happened to Wozniack today also."⁶⁰
- A message from S-2, 35th RCT to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 301100 July 1950 - - "Soldiers from 1/35 which has just returned from 27 RCT mentioned that two women had been caught in their area -- one woman carrying a bag of hand grenades, the other carrying a radio of the SCR 300 type."⁶¹
- The 24th Reconnaissance Company War Diary, July 23 - August 25, 1950 -- "At one point where a platoon of this company was forced to withdraw due to enemy envelopment, small arms fire was received from the rear from Koreans dressed in civilian clothing."⁶²
- The 25th Infantry Division Historical Report for July 8-31, 1950 states that: "'People in white' -- or 'PIW's' as they were called [--] were constantly infiltrating into and through our lines. To counter this threat, the Division commander was forced early in the engagement, to order that strong measures be taken by all commanders to stop this infiltration, since in many instances, the PIW's changed clothes, or still in white, turned on our forces, and attacked them in the rear and flanks. Such was the peculiar nature of the Korean war."⁶³
- The G-1 summary of the 24th Infantry Division War Diary, July 23 - August 25, 1950 -- "One of the greatest problems encountered was control of refugees. ...Several armed guerillas were detected, apprehended, and forwarded to EUSAK with incriminating evidence. The extent of this problem is difficult to describe; often a refugee concentration would contain 30-40,000 people plus cattle, horses, cars, etc."⁶⁴

There were also isolated reports of the NKPA forcing Korean civilians in advance of NKPA troops and into American positions. In the 27th Infantry Regiment's sector, about 200 refugees (women, children, and old men) walked into a battle position from the direction of the enemy. As the refugees were "creating some confusion as they were being rounded up and processed," a NKPA unit launched a frontal attack, its

"leading elements mingled with the stragglers of the refugee group." When questioned, the refugees said that NKPA troops had directed them toward the American position.⁶⁵

XIV. Lessons Learned About the Enemy

In mid-August 1950, Eighth Army published "Combat Information Bulletin Number One," distilling the experience of American forces after approximately six weeks of combat operations in Korea. Infiltration was "a problem of major proportion. North Korean soldiers are coming through the lines as refugees, securing arms and uniforms behind our lines and operating against our rear." The bulletin warned that the "fact that the enemy will occupy all terrain features that we do not physically occupy, with what appear to be civilians or refugees, has caused commanders to forcibly deny if necessary, any refugees within their sectors. They must be sent back toward the enemy lines." Infiltrating NKPA troops had proved capable of over-running American companies and even battalions; American units, the bulletin warned, had to ensure "strong local security and perimeter defense in depth in every case regardless of the size unit and its location to the front line."⁶⁶

To help prepare American soldiers going to Korea, the Department of the Army in August 1950 issued a pamphlet entitled *Army Four-Hour Pre-Combat Orientation Course (Korea)*. The pamphlet included the following information about the enemy:

Charlie Company learned about guerrillas, the hard way. One day a group of Korean 'civilians' strolled into a quiet defense position occupied by a company outpost. One of the Koreans who spoke English offered to sell the soldiers a chicken. He reached under his cloak, but instead of a chicken produced a gun. In the fight that ensued, the Americans lost several men. The guerrilla problem is complicated by the fact that North Koreans and South Koreans look alike and talk alike. At the risk of offending their South Korean friends, Charlie Company learned to be cautious of all Koreans whose identity and loyalty were not definitely known.⁶⁷

Some outside observers drew similar conclusions. An article by correspondent John Osborne in the August 21, 1950, issue of *LIFE* entitled "Report From The Orient: Guns Are Not Enough," provided the American public some insights about the problems that NKPA tactics, especially their exploitation of civilians, posed for American troops. In this article, Mr. Osborne portrayed vividly the situation in Korea and stressed the need for American leaders to recognize the union of politics and military operations in war rather than trying to segregate the two. He argued that because of the tactics used by the North Koreans, the war against the Communists in Asia could not be won by military means alone:

To attempt to win it so, as we are now doing in Korea, is not only to court final failure but also to force upon our men in the field acts and attitudes of the utmost savagery. This means not the usual, inevitable savagery of combat in the field but savagery in detail -- the blotting out of villages where the enemy *may* be hiding; the shooting and shelling of refugees who *may* include North Koreans in the anonymous white

clothing of the Korean countryside, or who *may* be screening an enemy march upon our positions, or who *may* be carrying broken-down rifles or ammunition clips or walkie-talkie parts in their packs and under their trousers or skirts.⁶⁸

While the full scope of NKPA infiltration and civilian exploitation remains difficult to determine it was clearly extensive. The U.S. Army in Korea clearly recognized the seriousness of this threat. The strongly worded directive issued by the 25th Infantry Division's commander further illustrates how serious this infiltration threat was taken. A memorandum dated July 27, 1950, addressed to the "Commanding Officers, all Regimental Combat Teams and Staff Sections, this Headquarters" stated: "Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly."⁶⁹ This area was not in the rear, but in front of U.S. positions: a distinct area within which the South Korean police had evacuated all South Korean civilians. The 25th Infantry Division War Diary for July 27, 1950, recorded that General Kean ordered commanders at all levels to take drastic action to prevent the movement of any Korean civilians into their areas within the combat zone. U.S. soldiers were to consider all persons in civilian clothes moving within the combat zone as enemy.⁷⁰ The combat zone was the area directly to the division's front where contact with the enemy was imminent or fighting was going on and not simply a forward position. Only by denying the NKPA the ability to infiltrate during combat operations could U.S. positions be protected. It should also be noted that the area described above in the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations was miles away from No Gun Ri. (See Plates 2 thru 11, Appendix E, for the location of units in the No Gun Ri area.) This policy in combat areas was no secret, for example on July 27 the Associated Press reported that: "All Korean civilians have been ordered out of the fighting zone southeast of Taejon. In an area once cleared of civilians, anyone in civilian clothing may be shot."⁷¹ (See Plates 2 thru 11 Appendix E.)

The situation is best summed up in the 1st Cavalry Division War Diary entry for July 24, 1950: "The control of refugees presented a difficult problem. No one desired to shoot innocent people, but many of the innocent looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all."⁷²

XV. Conclusion

The U.S. Army developed a good understanding of the NKPA's tactics soon after entering combat in Korea. However, personnel shortages, pre-war cuts to the force structure, and little experience in earlier wars with an enemy willing to exploit civilians on the battlefield handicapped the Eighth Army's efforts in July 1950 to use American doctrine effectively when dealing with such tactics as practiced by a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated enemy. Determining with certainty how this knowledge of North Ko-

rean tactics may have influenced 1st Cavalry Division soldiers' actions, and the actions of all U.S. soldiers, in the early days of combat is impossible. However, the soldiers were wary, and even prudently apprehensive, of the Korean civilian populace. To behave otherwise would have exposed soldiers to grave risks.

The first few weeks of the Korean War severely exposed the U.S. Army to a number of its own shortcomings as discussed in this chapter. These shortcomings, which were the result of peacetime readiness issues, training shortfalls, complex refugee problems, and ignorance of the NKPA's tactics, painted a bleak and daunting picture for the U.S. Army's continued prosecution of the war. This myriad of problems and challenges, both on and off the battlefield, represented the conditions that would define all units fighting in Korea in the first few weeks of the conflict. An appreciation and understanding of these factors help to clarify, and explain, the circumstances faced by the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea, one of the first U.S. units to clash with the NKPA in July 1950.

Endnotes

¹ Quoted in RG 332, USAFIK, Box 28, "Historical Journal of Korea" folder. A former Deputy Governor of Chulnam wrote to an American official that: Things are getting worse in [South] Korea by leaps and bounds. Some of the Americans are well-intentioned enough, but how can they govern a people when they don't understand the language, and don't know what is going on under their very noses?", quoted in E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York: 1951), 235. (Meade was a Korean MG official in the early days of the occupation.)

² Quoted in John R. Merrill, "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950", Ph.D. diss., University of Delaware (1982), 65.

³ Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 16 August 1950, File 091 Korea (23 Aug 50), Box 558, Chief of Staff Decimal File 1950, Record Group 319, "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces on Section II, Conclusions, and Section III, Recommendations, of Report of First Office, Chief of Army Field Forces' Observer Team to the Far East Command, 16 August 1950," enclosure to Letter, 28 August 1950, General Mark W. Clark to General J. Lawton Collins, File 350.07 Far East (28 Aug 50), Box 128, Army Intelligence Project Decimal File 1949-1950, RG 319, NARA.

⁴ William W. Epley, *America's First Cold War Army, 1945-1950* (Arlington, Virginia: The Institute of Land Warfare, 1993).

⁵ Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945-1950* (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1996); Harry R. Borowski, *A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment Before Korea* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982); Kolodziej, op. cit. For an outline of how the Army expected World War III to be fought, see the March 1949 testimony of General Omar N. Bradley in Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Eighty-first Congress, First Session, "National Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1950, Part 4: Department of the Army" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), 568-570.

⁶ Memo, 23 March 1949, The Inspector General to Chief of Staff, Subject: "Annual General Inspection, Fiscal Year 1949, Eighth United States Army," File 333 GEN, Box 698, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, RG 338, NARA. For a case study of these deleterious effects, see William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, *Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea* (Washington: United States Army Center of Military History, 1996), 42-60.

⁷ James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), 55; Headquarters Eighth Army, Office of the Commanding General, Memorandum 23 June 1949, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Reports," File 322 GEN, Box 697, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, RG 338, NARA.

⁸ "Combat Effectiveness Report," 21 July 1949.

⁹ Headquarters Eighth Army, Office of the Commanding General, Memorandum to Commander-in-Chief Far East, 20 October 1949, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Report," File 322 (SU), Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, Box 697, RG 338, NARA; Informal Check Slip, 20 October 1949, G-3 to G-1, G-4, DC/S, and CG, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Report," File 322 (SU), Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, Box 697, RG 338, NARA.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See Appendix E for the Organizational Chart of the 1st Cavalry Division - 7th Cavalry Regiment was a subordinate unit of 1st Cavalry Division.

¹² Memo, 7 October 1949, Commanding General I Corps to Commanding General Eighth Army, Subject: "Combat Effectiveness Report," File 353, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section Security Classified General Correspondence 1949, Box 700, RG 338, NARA.

¹³ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 54.

¹⁴ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 53-54; *Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1949), 7-11; *Field Manual 6-20, Field Artillery Tactics and Technique* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1948), 53-54; Jonathan M. House, *Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), 146-149; Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 2-7.

¹⁵ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 45-46, 58-59; James A. Huston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses for Susquehanna University Press, 1989), 25-36.

¹⁶ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 45-46; "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces."

¹⁷ "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces."

¹⁸ Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, 43-45, 85-86; "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces;" Office of the Adjutant General, "STM-30: Strength of the Army," 1 June 1950; Enclosure 2 to Memo, 18 May 1950, Colonel J.K. Wilson, Jr. to Secretary, General Staff, Subject: "Background Material for Gen Collins' Speech to the National War College."

¹⁹ "Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces;" Unknown, "Some Infantry Lessons From Korea," no date (but most likely late 1952), copy in File Geog V Korea 321 Infantry, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.; Department of the Army Circular No. 1, 1 January 1948, "Career Guidance Plan for Warrant Officers and Enlisted Personnel," Army Regulation 605-8, 17 August 1948, "Appointment of Lieutenants, Regular Army, From Officers on Extended Active Duty;" *Technical Manual 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1948). The background of regimental commanders and many battalion commanders is discussed in Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), passim. While flawed, an interesting case study of leadership in command positions is Faris R. Kirkland, "Soldiers and Marines at Chosin Reservoir: Criteria for Assignment to Combat Command," *Armed Forces and Society*, 22 (Winter 1995/96), 257-274.

²⁰ Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War* (6 vols.) (Seoul: 1975); W. Fox, *History of the Korean War: Inter-Allied Co-operation during Combat Operations* (Tokyo: Far East Command, N.D.); Grey, J., *The Commonwealth Armies: An Alliance Study* (Manchester: 1989).

²¹ G-1 Summary of 24th Infantry Division (ID) War Diary, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50. In Records of the Adjutant General's (AG) Office, AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th ID, Entry 429, Box 3481, RG 407, NARA.

²² Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1st Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA.

-
- ²³ Informal Check Slip and related documents, Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) HQs, 26 Jul 50, sub: Control of Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, 8th Army Adjutant General Section 1944-1956, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 729, RG 338, NARA.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA.
- ²⁶ Intelligence Instruction No. 4, EUSAK, 27 Jul 50. In Records of the Army Staff, Army Intelligence Project Decimal Files 1951-1952, Korea, Entry 47G, Box 163, RG 319, NARA.
- ²⁷ Activities Report, 25th ID G-1, 27 Jul 50. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Infantry Divisions, 25th ID, 1950, Box 806, RG 338, NARA.
- ²⁸ Order for Korean Leaflet, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FEC) Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Psychological Warfare Branch, circa 1950. In Records of the Army Staff; Records of the Executive Office, Unclassified Decimal File 1949-1950, Entry 260A, Box 17, RG 319, NARA.
- ²⁹ Noble, Harold Joyce, *Embassy at War*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975, pp. 152-153.
- ³⁰ War diary journal, 8th Cavalry Division, 18-30 July 1950. In the Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.
- ³¹ Monograph, "Civilian Control in South Korea," by LTC J.P. Powhida. In Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General; Administrative Division Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 1951-1952, Entry 433B, Box 221, RG 389, NARA.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Roy E. Appleman, *North to the Naktong, South to the Yalu* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 58-76.
- ³⁴ Appelman, 365-6.
- ³⁵ This assessment is based on what the NKPA was able to accomplish in spite of overwhelming UNC air and naval control and substantial artillery superiority and in the face of an almost two-to-one numerical inferiority during the Pusan Perimeter fighting, Appleman, Chapt. 15; James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction -- The First Year*, United States Army in the Korean War, U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washington: 1972). See E. H. Atkins, and R. Sessums, *North Korean Logistics and Methods of Accomplishment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, for U.S. Army, 1951); W. Bradbury, "Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity: The Communist Soldier in the Korean War", in S. Myers and A. Biderman, eds., *The Manipulation of Human Behavior* (Chicago: 1968). On the other hand, there was something brittle about the morale and discipline of the KPA, as demonstrated in its flight northward after the Inchon landings with far greater celerity than the UNC retreat at the beginning of the war.
- ³⁶ Report of the First OCAFF (Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces) Observer Team to the Far East Command", 16 August 1950, Entry 55, Box 171, RG 387, NARA.
- ³⁷ Appleman, 215-221. Among the dead was MG Chae Byong Duk, former ROK Army Chief of Staff, who was accompanying the 3rd Bn.
- ³⁸ Roy E. Appleman, *North to the Naktong, South to the Yalu* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 7-11.

³⁹ Ibid, 9-10; Richard A. Mobley, "North Korea: How Did It Prepare for the 1950 Attack?" *Army History*, no.49 (Spring 2000), 4, 7-8.

⁴⁰ John A English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, *On Infantry*, revised edition (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 89; Headquarters Eighth United States Army Korea, "Enemy Tactics," 26 December 1951, 56-60, in File "Enemy Tactics," U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office Organizational History Files, Box 73, RG 338, NARA; Appendix E, Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command," 16 August 1950, File 091 Korea (23 Aug 50), Chief of Staff Classified Decimal File 1950, Box 558, RG 319, NARA; Mobley, 3, 5-6.

⁴¹ English and Gudmundsson, *On Infantry*, 90; "Enemy Tactics," 21-23, 41-44, 112-117; Appendix E, "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command."

⁴² Change 1, 1 July 1948, to *Field Manual 30-102: Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces* (Washington: War Department, 1947), 131-134G; the quotation is from page 132. For American doctrine, see *Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1949), and *Field Manual 7-40: Infantry Regiment* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1950).

⁴³ Serial Number 28, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 Journal, copy in 1st Cavalry Division July 1950 War Diary, Box 54, Cavalry Divisions 1960-1967, RG 338, NARA. Doctrine for defense of wide frontages is in *Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1949), 140-142.

⁴⁴ The U.S. Army's World War II Ranger units had been inactivated after that war. On the Korean War Ranger program see David W. Hogan, *Rangers or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 105-142.

⁴⁵ Prisoner of War Interrogation Report, 24th Infantry Division, 7 Jul 50. In Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division, Box 3471, RG 407, NARA.

⁴⁶ Message, Eighth United States Army, 11 July 50. In Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 724, RG 338, NARA.

⁴⁷ Message, 24th Infantry Division G-2, 122200 Jul 50. In Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division G-2 Journal, Box 3474, RG 407, NARA.

⁴⁸ Report, Counter Intelligence Command (CIC) Team, 12 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th ID, Entry 429, Box 3471, RG 407, NARA.

⁴⁹ Memorandum, 25th Infantry Division, Notes on Liaison trip to United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) and 24th Infantry Division, 12-14 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division G-3 Journals, Box 680, RG 338, NARA.

⁵⁰ Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

⁵¹ Activities Report, 25th Infantry Division G-3, 19 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

⁵² Message, CG EUSAK, 191435K Jul 50. In Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

⁵³ Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.

-
- ⁵⁴ Prisoner of War Interrogation, 24th Infantry Division G-2 Language Section, 20 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division, Box 3471, RG 407, NARA.
- ⁵⁵ Annex A (Intelligence) to Operation Order No. 8, 25th Infantry Division, 220030 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division G-3 Journals, Box 682, RG 338, NARA.
- ⁵⁶ Periodic Report #10, 25th Infantry Division, 221800K to 231800K July 1950. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.
- ⁵⁷ Periodic Report #11, 25th Infantry Division, 231800K to 241800K July 1950. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.
- ⁵⁸ War Diary, Headquarters EUSAK, 23 July 1950, sub: Interrogation Report, North Korean Methods of Operation. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, Entry 429, Box 1084, RG 407, NARA.
- ⁵⁹ War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.
- ⁶⁰ Messages to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 28 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division Periodic Intelligence Reports 1950, Box 667, RG 338, NARA.
- ⁶¹ Message from S-2, 35 Regimental Combat Team to G-2, 25th Infantry Division, 301100 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division G-2 Journals, Box 634, RG 338, NARA.
- ⁶² War Diary, 24th Reconnaissance Company, 23 Jul - 25 Aug 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th Infantry Division, Book I-IV, Box 3481, RG 407, NARA.
- ⁶³ Narrative Historical Report, 25th Infantry Division, 8-31 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.
- ⁶⁴ G-1 Summary of 24th Infantry Division (ID) War Diary, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50. In Records of the Adjutant General's (AG) Office, AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 24th ID, Entry 429, Box 3481, Record Group (RG) 407, NARA.
- ⁶⁵ EUSAK Periodic Intelligence Report No. 20, 012400 August 1950, Eighth U.S. Army Adjutant General Section 1944-56, Security-Classified General Correspondence 1950, Box 714, RG 338, NARA.
- ⁶⁶ Headquarters Eighth United States Army Korea, Office of the Commanding General, "Combat Information Bulletin No. 1," Down loaded from the U.S. Army Military History Institute website, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=62>. While this document was issued without a date, other sources make it clear that it was issued sometime in mid-August 1950. A number of items in the bulletin are taken from earlier periodic intelligence reports issued by Eighth Army. A draft version, dated 25 July 1950, is included in "Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command." Lieutenant Colonel Warren S. Everett, a General Staff officer who visited Korea in August, reported that just prior to his departure from Korea on August 24, Eighth Army published the bulletin. "Report on Visit of Lt Colonel Everett (representative of G-3, D/A) to RECOM and USARPAC, 19-30 Aug 1950." In File 333 Pacific, Box 94, G3 Top Secret Decimal File 1950, RG 319, NARA.
- ⁶⁷ Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-105, *Army Four-Hour Pre-Combat Orientation Course (Korea)*, August 1950. In Army Intelligence Decimal Files 1950, Entry 2A, Box 572, RG 319, NARA.
- ⁶⁸ John Osborne, "Report From The Orient: Guns Are Not Enough," *LIFE*, Vol. 29, No. 8, August 21, 1950.

⁶⁹ Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

⁷⁰ War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.

⁷¹ News Bulletin, 25th Infantry Division Troop Information & Education (TI&E) Section, 27 Jul 50. In 25th Infantry Division, G-4 Journals, Box 766, RG 338, NARA.

⁷² War Diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 Jul 50. In Box 42, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office Organizational History Files, Entry 34407, Box 42, RG 338, NARA.

Photograph 1

July 10, 1950

"North Korean prisoners of war are searched and interrogated at Reg. CP, south of Chonui, American soldiers watch prisoners closely before they are questioned."

National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 319 Staff Prints, Box 38, Photograph SC 343314.



Photograph 2

July 24, 1950

"Fire in a section of Yongdong which was started by enemy artillery caused no appreciable damage to either American personnel or equipment."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 1088.



Photograph 3

July 25, 1950

"Aerial view of Yongdong."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports
1949-1954, Box 1088.



Photograph 4

July 25, 1950

"The inevitable backwash of war refugees by the thousands move south from Hwaggan toward Kum Chon as the 1st Cav and the North Korean Army fight it out over their farms and villages. Traffic problems are created on the inadequate roads, and some "refugees" have been found to be North Koreans in disguise."

National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 111, Entry 111-SC Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity 1900-1981, Box 185, Photograph SC 344601.



Photograph 5

July 25, 1950

"Artillery bursts on enemy positions in the hills around Yongdong Korea while the battle for the city goes on below."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports 1949-1954, Box 1088.



Photograph 6

July 25, 1950

"Enemy positions in hills around Yongdong receive artillery fire."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports
1949-1954, Box 1088.



Photograph 7

July 25, 1950

"1st Cavalry troops in fire fight at Yondong."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports
1949-1954, Box 1088.



Photograph 8

July 25, 1950

"Troops of 1st Cavalry Division in action at Yongdong."

National Archives, RG 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports 1949-1954,
Box 1088.



Photograph 9

July 26, 1950

"A 75mm Recoilless rifle covering a road in Korea."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports
1949-1954, Box 1088.



Photograph 10

July 26, 1950

"A 3.5" Rocket Launcher team prepares to fire."

National Archives, Record Group 407, Entry 429 Army AG Command Reports
1949-1954, Box 1088.



Photograph 11

July 29, 1950

"South Korean refugees crowd roads leading south after being ordered to leave by the South Korean Army."

National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 111, Entry 111-SC Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity 1900-1981, Box 185, Photograph SC 344505.



344505

Photograph 12

July 29, 1950

"South Korean refugees pouring out of village near Yongdok, Korea, going south."

National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 319, Entry Staff Prints, Box 38, Photograph SC 345363.



Photograph 13

August 5, 1950

"North Korean snipers being searched and interrogated by American and South Korean troops somewhere in Korea."

National Archives-Still Pictures Branch, Record Group 111, Entry 111-SC Signal Corps Photographs of American Military Activity 1900-1981, Box 187, Photograph SC 346059.

